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Dealing with would be military leaders: reflecting further on dealing with coup d’états in Africa

December 3rd, 2009 No comments

overthrowOn November 30, I presented some first thoughts on dealing with coup d’états in Africa and would now like to address some of my reasoning behind that post. In that posting, I suggested the following as a potentially desirable approach:  

I’d like to offer the following: the African Union, in its charter, and each country in Africa, each in its constitution, should enshrine a provision that requires that whenever a government is overthrown, the coup plotters must hold elections within nine months. Furthermore, the provision must provide that none of the fifty highest ranking members of the plotters can run for any of the top three offices in the subsequent election. 

My reasoning was, basically, to eliminate the “reward” for leading a coup so as to discourage them. Essentially, I am assuming that each person who leads a coup and those who participate in it are making rational decisions. If so, then the potential for participating in a coup and then remaining as leader of the country or in a senior position in the post-coup government serves as an incentive in the rational decision making process for coup plotters. These plotters would weigh all potential benefits against all potential harms. Chief among the “benefits” are power and money. The potential harms include failure of the coup, jail time and possible execution. 

 My recommendation would make coups unpalatable for most plotters who do not have a greater interest in mind because it attempts to eliminate the possibility of participating in a coup and then gaining power and money if the coup is successful. In other words, a plotter making a rational decision about whether to stage a coup or not will likely decide against it because he has little to gain personally but so much to loose. On the other hand, if staging the coup would provide some greater good (or personal benefit) beyond power and money that is also weighed by the participants as worthy of the risks of staging the coup, then and only then would the plotters stage the coup.

First thoughts on dealing with coup d’états and military overthrows in Africa

November 30th, 2009 No comments

It seems the coup d’état or violent overthrow of Africa’s leaders, civilian or military, is something that had been with us for a while and will continue to be with was, at least for the near future. In recent past, the response of overthrowAfrican leaders to a coup d’état has improved dramatically. Rather than doing nothing or encouraging the coup-plotters-turn-leader, they, at least at times, demand that the rulers take steps that sometime include holding elections and/or stepping down.

I’d like to offer the following: the African Union, in its charter, and each country in Africa, each in its constitution, should enshrine a provision that requires that whenever a government is overthrown, the coup plotters must hold elections within nine months. Furthermore, the provision must provide that none of the fifty highest ranking members of the plotters can run for any of the top three offices in the subsequent election.

Part of our current problem is that there are no rules. Literally. Coup plotters often suspend the constitution and the African Union and the international Community deals with each country on a case by case basis. As a result, each coup plotter attempts to negotiate a good deal for himself because that option is always on the table.

We must do what we can to take the option of remaining as a legitimate ruler off the table. We must set incentives such that an individual who stages a coup d’état does so only because it if for the betterment of his country. We must also set conditions such that the default is to condemn coup plotters, rather than negotiations that all too often lead to coup plotters remaining in power.

Will this put an end to overthrows? No. Will this ensure that the only people who stage coup d’états are doing so only for the betterment of their country? No. But could it discourage some would-be coup plotters? Yes. Would it make it easier to say “no” to military men who seize power? Yes. Would it provide a response to the “no meddling in other countries’ affairs” problem? Yes.